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 The construction of urgency discourse around mega-projects: the Israeli case 
 
Abstract  
Various studies have pointed to urgency in decision-making as a major catalyst for policy change.  
Urgency evokes a crisis frame in which emotions and cognitive and institutional biases are more likely 
to be mobilised in support of the policy preferences of powerful actors. As a result, decision-makers 
tend to be driven by emotions and opportunity, often with detrimental results for the quality of the 
planning process. Although urgency has such a profound influence on the quality of decision-making, 
little is known about how, when, and by whom urgency is constructed in the planning process of public 
infrastructure. By means of a discourse analysis, this study traces the timing, motives and ways actors 
discursively construct a sense of urgency in decision-making on the building of terminals for the 
reception and treatment of the natural gas that was recently found off the coast of Israel. The results of 
this study indicate that mostly government regulators, but also private sector actors, deliberately 
constructed an urgency discourse at critical moments during the planning process. By framing the 
planning process as urgent, regulators manipulatively presented the policy issue as a crisis, during 
which unorthodox planning practices were legitimised while the consideration of alternative planning 
solutions was precluded. Thus, urgency framing is a means of controlling both the discourse and the 
agenda – and therefore an exercise in power-maintenance – by entrenched interest groups.  
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Introduction 
The McKinsey Global Institute (Dobbs et al. 2013) forecasts a 60% increase in infrastructure 
expenditure in the coming two decades, mainly to be delivered as mega-projects. The propensity to 
favour mega-projects (Priemus 2008) aggravates the discordance between mega-project planning and 
the values of economic efficiency, truth-telling and proper democratic process (Flyvbjerg 2012). 
Project viability figures and benefit forecasts are over-optimistic on a structural basis (Bruzelius et al. 
2002), leading to a situation where “cost overruns and benefit shortfalls are inherent to mega-projects” 
(Flyvbjerg 2012: 174). Mega-project planning tends to function as a vehicle for less democratic and 
more elite-driven priorities (Swyngedouw et al. 2002). For this reason and because they are often 
substantially financed by public funds, mega-projects have become an object of major concern and 
resentment for the general public (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003).  
Despite their poor performance records, mega-projects are known to cast “a powerful magnetic spell on 
ambitious politicians” (Priemus 2010: 1023) who attempt to win social and political support by 
presenting a more optimistic image of mega-project planning than reality justifies (Bruzelius et al. 
2002). The contention around mega-projects often implies that both project proponents and opponents 
try to exercise power by “imposing a particular frame or discourse onto the discussion” (Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005: 177). Because the dominant discourse “provides a bias both in conceptualising the 
problem at hand as well as the solution that can be conceived for those problems” (Hajer and Versteeg 
2005: 179), it is of paramount importance for those wishing to influence decision-making to dominate 
the discourse regarding the problem in order to create support for their preferred policy (Lakoff 2010). 
A common framing mode is urgency. By framing the issue as urgent, a bias geared toward action in 
decision-making is mobilised (De Jong 2008). Urgency framing is employed in an attempt to coax 
decision-makers to go ahead with the project. It is instrumental in mobilising support for the solution 
preferred by the actors who dominate the discourse and is often exploited to justify the exclusion of 
actors who promote alternatives to the proposed mega-project from participating in the decision-
making process. Although various studies touch on the subject of urgency (e.g., Garb 2004; Huijs 2011; 
Majoor 2011; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), no study has yet been undertaken on urgency as a 
deliberate discursive strategy to increase the likelihood of project realisation. Given the immense risks 
and uncertainties associated with large-scale infrastructure project planning and the potentially 
disastrous effect of urgency on the decision-making process (cf. Maor 2012, 2014), the function of 
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urgency in the policy process critically requires scrutinising. This study seeks to fill that void by 
analysing how urgency discourse is portrayed by actors who partake in the policy process, when during 
this process the use of urgency discourse is triggered, and how urgency is institutionalised as an 
integral part of the policy process. For that intended purpose this study scrutinises the minutes of 
National Outline Plan 37/H (henceforth NOP 37/H) on natural gas reception and treatment terminals, a 
proposed energy infrastructure mega-project for the transportation, reception, treatment and distribution 
of the vast reserves of natural gas that were recently found off the coast of Israel. 
In the following section, the literature on the cognitive, discursive and institutional aspects of urgency 
is reviewed and concluded with an outline of the hypotheses. Then the case study is presented, 
followed by the data and methods for empirical analysis, and the results of this research. The final 
section opens with a discussion of the results and concludes with the theoretical and practical 
implications of the results. 
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The cognitive effect of urgency 
Decision-making is a complex cognitive process that critically involves the processing of large 
amounts of information in a limited period of time, regarding various issues that demand attention 
(Ariely and Zakay 2001). The time and attention of the decision-maker are scarce resources for which 
many issues compete (True et al. 1999). Presenting an issue as a crisis or emergency demanding urgent 
action may help to gain recognition and attention for the issue (Zahariadis 2003). Urgency is then 
instrumental in prioritising the issue at hand and justifies disproportionate allocation of time and 
resources to its solution (Ariely and Zakay 2001; Lipsky and Smith 1989). The premise that the issue 
may be exacerbated by inaction urges the decision-maker to act expeditiously. As a result, issue 
prioritisation and choice and agenda-setting take place under stress conditions (Zahariadis 2003).  
However, when confronted with urgency, the cognitive ability of the decision-maker to detect biases 
and assume a critical attitude to the decision-making process becomes compromised (Maor 2014). 
Deadlines for example increase the likelihood of error and limit the creative ability of the decision-
maker to deal with changing circumstances (Carpenter and Grimmer 2009). Information that does not 
correspond with the ideologies and pre-existing biases of the decision-maker is less likely to be 
processed and is at times even outright rejected (Ariely and Zakay 2001). Existing biases markedly 
limit the scope of possible alternative consideration (Hoeffler et al. 2006). Thus decision-making under 
time-stress tends to be characterised by bolstering preferred solutions and discarding viable alternatives 
(Ariely and Zakay 2001). As a result, decision-makers are not driven by rationality, but by emotions 
and opportunity instead (Lorenzoni and Benson 2014; Maor 2014). The emotional responses to time-
stress often promote risk-taking behaviour in the decision-making process (Tversky and Kahneman 
1981). Urgency directly affects the emotional state of the decision-maker, effecting change in the very 
process by which decisions are made (Maule et al. 2000). This would suggest that through the changed 
behaviour of the decision-maker, urgency can permeate the policy process and may become 
institutionalised in the policy that is ultimately adopted. However, this angle is largely overlooked by 
existing studies. Most studies that deal with urgency tend to focus on the effects of urgency and time-
pressure on the cognitive capacity for decision-making at the level of the individual (cf. Ariely and 
Zakay 2001; Maule et al. 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  Yet no study is explicitly concerned 
with the ramifications of urgency on an institutional level. 
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The institutionalisation of urgency  
The cognitive limitations of the decision-maker render the policy process inherently resistant to policy 
change. Only the information that represents the interests of those in power is considered (Cobb and 
Elder 1971). Agenda-setting and the policy process are therefore expressions of the mobilised biases of 
decision-makers (Schattschneider 1960), which become ingrained in institutional standards, norms and 
operational practices (True et al. 1999). Given these premises, the theory of punctuated equilibrium 
posits that the political system generates friction and is inherently conservative (Jones and Baumgartner 
2012). As a mechanism of maintaining the institutional status quo, friction serves to constrain policy 
action and provide institutional stability in a complex environment. Only when the urgency of the 
problem has become such that the institutional status quo does no longer suffice, and immediate 
response is needed, the political system will overcome friction. This implies that policy-making 
oscillates between underreacting and overreacting to external signals (Jones and Baumgartner 2012) 
that may be triggered by urgency.  
The literature on policy change points towards the use of discursive devices that connect the policy 
ideas of the actors involved in the decision-making process with policy action (Fischer and Forester 
1993; Hajer 1995). A perceived sense of urgency in the policy process is articulated and communicated 
to other actors in the policy process and to the public in order to set the agenda and drive policy 
change. In the literature on climate change policy for example, it has been marked that metaphors such 
as “apocalyptic” (Foust and O'Shannon Murphy 2009), “catastrophic”, “rapid”, “urgent” and 
“irreversible” (Risbey 2008) are used as rhetorical strategies to frame the issue as being in urgent need 
of affirmative policy action. Argumentative and persuasive rhetoric is another linguistic mechanism 
through which urgency can be portrayed in the policy process. For instance, crisis rhetoric is employed 
to instil a sense of urgency in various policy processes, driving the UK government to adopt ambitious 
policies regarding climate change (Lorenzoni and Benson 2014), driving comprehensive education 
policy reforms in the EU (Nordin 2014), generating public consensus for major urban intervention in 
Rio de Janeiro (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), and advancing an investment agenda in the 
development of the Barcelona Forum (Majoor 2011). Framing is yet another linguistic mechanism that 
provides a lens through which reality is interpreted, organised, and communicated (Fischer and 
Forester 1993). Frames on policy issues are realised in the policy actions of the actors involved, and 
manifest in the discourse, metaphors and narratives used to describe the issue (Rein and Schön 1993).  
6 
Policy change can be conceptualised as the mobilisation of cognitive and institutional mechanisms 
which can result in the generation of “new sets of rules, values and practices” (Lorenzoni and Benson 
2014: 12). Institutional measures that facilitate strong emotional responses of decision-makers to crisis-
events often come at excessive social costs (Maor 2012). Streamlining the policy process is one such 
mechanism that can be triggered by urgency. For example, the sense of urgency that accompanied the 
perceived crisis of Israel's lag in road infrastructure development triggered government regulators to 
facilitate the development of the Trans-Israel Highway by steering it smoothly through bureaucracy 
(Garb 2004). Other institutional mechanisms used in the context of urgency include the exclusion of 
actors from participating in the decision-making process and the lack of consideration of alternatives. 
For example, during the decision-making process on the Olympic City in Rio de Janeiro excessive 
measures aimed at meeting deadlines were authorised, such as the exclusion of local and environmental 
groups and the acceleration of the decision-making process (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013). Likewise, 
in response to the perceived urgency of the development of the floodplain of the Yamuna River in 
Delhi, excessive instruments of policy process streamlining, such as the suspension of legal, procedural 
and regulatory practices, were institutionalised as a practice of planning (Follmann 2015). 
Securitisation can provide yet another institutional mechanism. In the policy process on the exportation 
of natural gas in Israel, urgency was mobilised to justify excessive and non-democratic institutional 
measures to prevent alleged existential threats from materialising (Fischhendler and Nathan 2014). 
The effect of urgency thus is not only cognitive, but also institutional: attention and agenda-setting are 
functions of bias, opportunity and emotions, which causes urgency to permeate the decision-making 
process and the policy system itself (Maor 2014). A strong sense of urgency can develop when the issue 
at hand is felt to be in a state of crisis or when such emotions can be evoked (De Jong 2008). In other 
words, urgency is a function of crisis-like events. The urgency that develops as result of a crisis creates 
momentum to overcome friction, driving decision-makers to act swiftly. Communicating and 
maintaining a sense of urgency during the policy process, whether artificial or the lasting result of a 
crisis, is therefore pivotal for decision-makers who pursue policy change. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear how decision-makers communicate and maintain a sense of urgency that succeeds to 
materialise in policy change. Although various studies touch upon institutional mechanisms that can be 
triggered by urgency (e.g., Garb 2004; Lipsky and Smith 1989; Fischhendler and Nathan 2014; 
Follmann 2015; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), as of yet no study investigates the role of urgency in 
facilitating the policy process. 
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Urgency as a discursive construct 
Policy can be conceptualised as the institutionalised expressions of the policy ideas, preferences, 
ideologies and cognitive biases of decision-makers. These expressions are constructed at the level of 
the discourse through which they are expressed (Schmidt 2011). Discourse as the “ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena” (Hajer 
2006: 67) thus fulfils the function of generating a shared understanding of the policy issue (Lorenzoni 
and Benson 2014). Whether or not the policy issue is perceived as a problem depends on how it is 
described and framed (Fischer and Forester 1993). As a result, the way in which different actors make 
sense of the problem and give meaning to it defines how it is perceived in the policy process (Dryzek 
1997). Therefore, discourse can be used to dominate and reinforce the position of dominant social 
groups (McFarlane and Rutherford 2008; Schmidt 2011). In the case of infrastructure, the nexus 
between the discursive and material dimensions of infrastructure policy reflects the balance of social 
power relations. Actors who define the problem and its subsequent solutions in terms other than the 
dominant discourse often find themselves excluded from the decision-making process (Bruzelius et al. 
2002).  
Urgency may play a central role in the discursive manipulation of the policy process. Urgency 
discourse is exploited to tie together government and private actors in a discourse coalition that shapes 
a shared perception of reality (Rafey and Sovacool 2011: 1143) and dominates the discursive space of 
the political realm in order to create support for the industry and government preferred policy (Hajer 
1995). In the case of the Trans-Israel Highway, urgency discourse was a catalyst in framing the policy 
process itself as a crisis, driving the push for additional road infrastructure from the discursive space 
toward rapid project implementation (Garb 2004). In other words, urgency discourse capitalises on the 
reduction of the cognitive ability of the decision-maker to detect biases and assume a critical attitude to 
the decision-making process. By mobilising biases, the use of urgency discourse increases the 
likelihood of implementation of the policy preferred by the most powerful actors. Crises thus appear to 
be socially constructed by dominant actors who have the capacity to discursively mobilise the crisis to 
reinforce their interests (McFarlane and Rutherford 2008). 
Many studies demonstrate the effects of discursively constructed crises on the policy process, but little 
research has explained the role of urgency discourse specifically in artificially creating these crises. 
This study proposes a novel motivation for rapid policy change, namely that urgency discourse drives 
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rapid policy change by discursively creating artificial crises. In the decision-making processes on urban 
mega-projects such as the Barcelona Forum (Majoor 2011) and the Olympic City in Rio de Janeiro 
(Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), as well as on large-scale infrastructure projects (e.g., Flyvjberg 2012; 
Garb 2004; Giglioli and Swyngedouw 2008), examples are found where urgency discourse and an 
appeal to the severity of the problem are used to accelerate the decision-making process and to justify 
the exclusion of various less powerful actors from participating in the proper democratic process. The 
role of urgency discourse herein is touched upon, but not given the prominence this study expects 
urgency plays in the policy process.  
 
Study Hypotheses 
This study combines the cognitive, institutional and discursive aspects of urgency into a single holistic 
approach toward its role in driving policy change. This study expects that a sense of urgency not only 
develops as a result of crisis-driven policy change, but that urgency discourse is also employed 
strategically and manipulatively to portray any policy issue in a crisis frame to mobilise biases toward 
action in the policy process. 
Therefore, this study presents the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1 A range of linguistic and institutional mechanisms will be used in the name of urgency to 
justify and facilitate excessive and unorthodox decision-making practices.  
Hypothesis 2 The more an actor frames the policy issue as urgent, the more he is likely to propose 
institutional measures that facilitate urgency and the less likely he is to maintain a critical outlook on 
the policy process. 
Hypothesis 3 The use of urgency discourse is not random in time. Urgency statements will be triggered 
by contextual events in order to reinforce the urgency frame of the policy process. 
Hypothesis 4 Urgency discourse will be more used by actors when the policy plan is about to 
materialise. In the early procedural context of agenda-setting and later during the decision-making 
stages a large increase in urgency statements is expected as opposed to the use of urgency discourse 
during the less decisive stages in the policy process. 
Hypothesis 5 The more extensive the vested interest of the actor in the timely finalisation of the policy 
plan, the more urgency statements will occur in the venues where that actor is strongly represented.
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Case study  
The Israeli energy sector 
Historically, Israel has been considered low on indigenous energy resources and therefore highly 
dependent on foreign fossil fuel imports to meet the energy demands of its growing economy and 
population. Despite the efforts to find oil and gas, Israel proved to be dry of fossil fuel reserves (Bahgat 
2005). Because of the hostile relations with resource-rich countries in the region, Israel has been forced 
to import oil and natural gas from distant oil and gas producing countries such as Mexico, Russia and 
Norway (Bahgat 2005). This along with the fact that, with the recent exception of Egypt, Israel's energy 
infrastructure system has never been integrated with that of neighbouring states, has contributed to 
Israel's image as an “energy island” (Shaffer 2011). Due to population growth, rising living standards 
and climate change, demands for electricity are projected to double in the coming two decades. These 
factors increasingly stress the ability to meet electricity demands, especially during peak consumption 
(Ministry of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources 2015). This implies that even a 
minor malfunction in the electrical grid can cause the system to collapse, an event which already 
happened once in 2002 and cost the Israeli economy NIS 700 million (State Comptroller 2009). As a 
result, a sense of urgency to diversify energy resources and to reduce Israel's dependency on foreign 
energy resources characterises Israeli energy policy (Shaffer 2011). Israel's position as a net energy 
resource importer did not notably change until the discoveries of several offshore natural gas reserves 
in 2009 and 2010 transformed Israel's energy position completely. In 2009, the Tamar gas field was 
discovered, which contains about 283 Billion Cubic Metres (henceforth BCM) of natural gas. A year 
later in 2010, the Leviathan gas field, containing around 530 BCM of natural gas, was discovered 
(Stern 2013). Combined with several smaller gas fields, approximately 950 BCM of natural gas were 
discovered between 2009 and 2012 in Israeli waters, an amount that “can provide by 2020 up to 73% of 
Israel's energy supply for the next 50 years, if not exported” (Fischhendler and Nathan 2014: 155). In 
2009, the Government of Israel started to plan the urgent development of the necessary infrastructure to 
connect the newly discovered Tamar gas field to the Israeli grid, before existing gas reserves would 
deplete in 2013 (Shaffer 2011). In anticipation of acute and severe resource scarcity, the urgency to 




National Outline Plan 37/H  
After the discovery of the Tamar gas field off the coast of the port city of Haifa in 2009, it was deemed 
necessary to develop an additional gas treatment terminal, north of the two existing gas terminals near 
Ashkelon and Ashdod respectively (State Comptroller 2013). For this purpose, the Ministry of National 
Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources was tasked to prepare a national outline plan for the 
construction of the necessary infrastructure for the transportation, reception, treatment and distribution 
of the newly discovered reserves of natural gas, one of the largest infrastructure mega-projects ever 
undertaken in Israel. This mega-project involved the building of offshore reception and treatment 
platforms, onshore reception and treatment terminals for additional treatment and the necessary 
pipeline infrastructure to connect the offshore gas fields to the national grid. Citing lack of expertise 
and a strong sense of urgency to bring the Tamar gas field online in 2013, at the time the Yam Tethys 
gas field was expected to deplete, Noble Energy, an American private company, was appointed by the 
National Planning and Building Council to prepare NOP 37/H. This was contrary to Israeli planning 
laws which assign planning responsibilities to the government and its planning institutions, and not to 
private entities who have a vested interest in the outcome of the planning process (State Comptroller 
2013). In August 2010, a year after the planning process commenced, the High Court of Justice (2010) 
ruled this decision unlawful and ordered the planning process to be started anew, despite the urgent 
need for local energy resources. Moreover, the controversy surrounding the decision on alternative sites 
for the gas terminals prompted civil society actors to turn to the courts, further delaying the planning 
process by at least another year (State Comptroller 2013). Government regulators pushed for full 
onshore gas terminals, arguing that these could be realised much faster and at a price lower by at least 
NIS 6 billion than full offshore gas terminals (Natural Gas Authority 2013). Environmental and local 
groups vehemently opposed this option and pushed for full offshore gas terminals (State Comptroller 
2013). The involvement of a major stakeholder in the preparation of the policy plan did not only 
backfire legally, it also caused considerable financial damage to the Israeli economy. As a direct result 
of the restart of the planning process which delayed the preparations for operationalisation of the Tamar 
gas field, and because of an acute local energy scarcity, energy prices in Israel sharply increased by 
32% between the years 2011 and 2013, leading to estimated damages of around NIS 20 billion to the 
Israeli economy (Barkat 2013; Gutman 2013). The planning process has been ongoing for five years 
since it was restarted in 2010. Although the government has approved NOP 37/H, its implementation 




On 23 October 2014, the Israeli Government decided to validate NOP 37/H. From spring 2009 until the 
end of 2014, NOP 37/H was discussed in different venues and at various levels of decision-making. 
This study views policy-making in an institutional setting as an interactive and dynamic process of the 
generation and communication of policy ideas and their transformation into policy action (cf. Schmidt 
2011). Only those venues where the policy plan was negotiated in an institutional setting were deemed 
relevant, thus excluding, for example, the media as a relevant venue. Therefore, this study examines the 
official protocols of hearings of the governmental and political committees involved in formulating the 
policy plan. The protocols on NOP 37/H comprise the policy discussions that took place in different 
political and planning venues. The discussions in the national venue are documented in the official 
protocols of the National Planning and Building Council and the Editors Committee. The discussions 
that took place in the designated venue are recorded in the official protocols of the Committee for the 
Protection of the Coastal Environment and the Subcommittee on Principle Planning Matters. In the 
regional venue, discussions are recorded in the protocols of various Regional Planning and Building 
Councils. In the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, the issue was discussed during plenary sessions and by 
parliamentary committees. 
Table 1 outlines the database, which comprises 117 protocols that were found relevant for the purpose 
of this study.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] Table 1 Overview of Dataset 
Coding urgency 
For each protocol, language that ascribes a shortened perception of time and a sense of crisis to the 
policy process was identified as an indicator of urgency. Every instance where an actor related to the 
crisis or emergency aspect of the policy issue was designated as an urgency statement. Policy issues are 
portrayed as urgent through the use of linguistic mechanisms. Therefore it was established whether the 
policy issue was framed as urgent rhetorically or through the use of metaphors. For all statements that 
instil a sense of urgency and crisis, the linguistic mechanisms used to portray urgency were 
documented. Altogether 108 urgency statements were found.  
For every urgency statement, the venue where the statement was made and the actor who made the 
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statement were documented. Most urgency statements were found in the protocols of the national 
venue, in contrast to the regional venue that accounts for a mere 4 urgency statements (see table 1). 
Actors were divided into groups that represent government regulators, private entities, national 
politicians, local politicians and civil society, which is made up of local groups and environmental 
groups. Each category represents an interest group directly involved with the policy process of NOP 
37/H.  
In addition to urgency statements, critical responses to urgency were also coded for each protocol 
where NOP 37/H was discussed. A critical response to urgency was designated as any response that 
relates negatively to the perceived urgency of the planning process. This implies that cases of critical 
responses to urgency may be found in protocols where no urgency statements were made. A total of 34 
critical responses were found in the protocols of the national venue, closely followed by parliament 
which accounts for 30 critical responses. The least number of critical responses to urgency were 
recorded in the designated venue, where only 3 were found. For the purpose of determining the 
intensity of urgency raised in the venue, the ratio of the number of critical responses to urgency to the 
number of urgency statements was calculated. A ratio larger than 1 indicates a more critical venue (see 
table 1). Thus it was determined which venues were more encouraging of urgency and which venues 
were more critical of urgency. 
For each urgency statement, a referent object was identified as the policy issue which the actor relates 
to as urgent. The referent object is based on the Copenhagen School's speech-act approach to security 
analysis which identifies referent objects as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened or that 
have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36). In this study, referent objects were 
categorised more broadly to apply specifically to urgency. Policy issues perceived to be threatened or 
compromised when they are not dealt with in an urgent manner include the economic development of 
Israel, the prolonged dependency on foreign energy imports, the affordability of energy, the availability 
of energy, and the environment. Multiple referent objects may be referred to in the context of a single 
urgency statement. Similarly, urgency statements may be found where no referent object was referred 
to. These cases and those in which it was not clear which policy issue was considered to be under threat 
if not dealt with urgently were categorised as unclear.  
Since urgency may be driven by crisis-like events (see De Jong 2008), urgency statements were also 
coded in relation to the contextual events that triggered them. Contextual events were categorised as 
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events external to the policy process or as internal events that provide context within the policy cycle. 
Internal events were designated by identifying during which stage of the policy cycle urgency was 
raised for each protocol. The internal events documented in this study coincide with the stages of 
agenda-setting and decision-making on policy alternatives in the policy cycle (see Howlett and Ramesh 
2003). External events that triggered and legitimised the use of urgency discourse are resource scarcity 
and events where government regulators were summoned to parliament in order to explain and clarify 
controversial decisions. It was thus determined at what moment during the policy process and to what 
purpose an actor chose to raise urgency, and in which context urgency was most triggered.  
The literature has indicated that crises often have detrimental effects on the policy process. Therefore, 
all cases in which extreme policy suggestions were stressed or justified in the name of urgency were 
documented. For each urgency statement, it was determined whether during the policy discussion an 
institutional measure was proposed to deal with the urgent policy matter within the context of that 
statement, and which actor proposed it. Institutional measures that were proposed in reaction to 
urgency, such as the exclusion of actors from participating in the policy process, the facilitation of 
urgency by streamlining the planning procedure and the suppression of alternative sites for establishing 
the gas terminals, were documented. 
In order to identify whether urgency triggered a critical response, it was established for every urgency 
statement whether a critical response was attached to it. Every instance of criticism of proposed 
institutional measures was associated with the actor raising it, and with the venue where the critical 
response was recorded. Subsequently, the ratio of the number of proposed institutional measures to the 
number of criticisms of institutional measures was calculated per actor group and per venue for each 
category of institutional measures. In this manner it was possible to determine for each actor group 
which institutional measure was proposed most to facilitate urgency, and which was criticised most 
often. In a similar fashion, it could be determined in which venues urgency was facilitated more, and 
which venues were more critical. In order to avoid division by zero in cases where no observations 
were made, ratios were calculated by n(institutional measure proposed)+1 / n(criticism of institutional 
measure)+1. A ratio above 1 indicates that the facilitation of urgency was encouraged (see table 2 and 
3). This approach served to determine whether the institutional measures proposed in response to 
urgency were indeed negative as hypothesised. 
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Results 
The institutionalisation of urgency: locale and criticism 
The ratio of the average number of critical responses per protocol to the average number of urgency 
statements per protocol in table 1 shows an inverse relation between urgency discourse and critical 
discourse. Certain venues seem to encourage the use of urgency discourse whereas others do not. For 
example, the designated venue and the national venue were found to encourage the use of urgency 
discourse, in contrast to the regional venue which appeared to embolden a more critical attitude to 
urgency. Parliament seems more tolerant, both of the use of urgency discourse and of the expression of 
criticism of urgency. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] Table 2 Urgency and Criticism by Venue 
Table 2 shows the breakdown of urgency statements into referent objects as a function of the venue 
where the urgency statement was made, the distribution of the institutional measures that were 
proposed to facilitate urgency, and the distribution of the criticism of those institutional measures. From 
the distribution of referent objects that justified the use of urgency discourse, energy availability clearly 
is the greatest concern in all venues. However, regarding the other referent objects, differences in 
distribution between the venues can be discerned. Environmental concerns, for example, were referred 
to in all venues but only stood out in the designated venue where these concerns accounted for 26% of 
referent objects. In parliament, both foreign dependency and economic development account for 16% 
of referent objects in contrast, for example, to the designated and national venues, where those referent 
objects were of very minor concern.  
In many cases where urgency was raised, institutional measures were proposed to suppress alternative 
sites for the gas terminal, to exclude other actors, and to facilitate urgency by streamlining the 
procedure. In all venues, except for the regional venue, streamlining the planning procedure was most 
often proposed in order to facilitate urgency. There seems to be a direct one-to-one relationship 
between the number of urgency statements and the number of proposals of institutional measures. For 
example, in the national venue a total of 60 urgency statements were made and 63 institutional 
measures were proposed. Similarly in the designated venue, 16 urgency statements were recorded 
against 15 proposals of institutional measures. Parliament, however, seems to be an exception. Most of 
the institutional measures were proposed in the national venue, to which actors responded with ample 
criticisms of institutional measures, in contrast to the regional venue where hardly any urgency 
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statements were made, and subsequently very few proposals for institutional measures and criticisms 
thereof were found. When taking into account the ratio of proposed institutional measures to their 
criticism, parliament evidently is the most critical venue whereas the national and designated venues 
are the least critical. This suggests that urgency was more prominent in the national venue, allowing for 
the proposal of institutional measures whilst suppressing criticism, in contrast to parliament for 
example where criticism was very prominent. 
The portrayal of urgency 
Each actor constructed urgency differently and in accordance with the interests of the actor group. 
Urgency was predominantly constructed by presenting urgency as a rhetorical and argumentative 
linguistic mechanism that connects the rationale for urgency with the preferred course of action. The 
majority of urgency statements were causal in that they presented the policy issue in terms that express 
haste or crisis, followed by the rationale and then the solution. The rationale for urgency and the 
solution coincide with the referent object and institutional measure, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] Table 3 Urgency and Criticism by Actor 
Table 3 presents the breakdown of urgency statements into referent objects as a function of the actor 
group which raised them. Table 3 reveals a polarity between regulators and private entities who account 
for the majority of urgency statements and proposals for institutional measures, and civil society, 
national and local politicians, who account for the bulk of critical responses to proposed institutional 
measures. Actors frame the discourse around urgency in a different manner. For regulators and private 
entities, energy availability was the greatest concern. For civil society and local politicians, the main 
justification for raising urgency was environmental concerns. Regulators are the only actor group that 
referred to a wide range of referent objects. Most notably affordability and foreign dependency were of 
significant concern to regulators alone. Economic development, on the other hand, was of minor 
concern to regulators, but of significant concern to private entities, civil society and national 
politicians. Moreover, regulators accounted for the vast majority of unclear referent objects, which may 
suggest that they used urgency discourse more as a rhetorical device to gain attention, than to express a 
genuine concern. 
Actors who raised urgency often also more frequently proposed institutional measures. With 77 
proposals, regulators proposed the most institutional measures by far. They are followed by private 
entities with 9 proposals, civil society and local politicians who both proposed 3 institutional measures 
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and national politicians who proposed just 2 institutional measures. Except for private entities, all actor 
groups mostly proposed to facilitate urgency by streamlining the planning procedure. Private entities, 
however, most frequently proposed to suppress alternative sites for gas terminals, which may reflect 
their vested interest in a specific site over other possible sites. 
When taking into account the number of times institutional measures are criticised, an inverse relation 
between the number of proposals of institutional measures and the number of critical reactions to 
institutional measures can be discerned. National politicians, local politicians and civil society hardly 
proposed institutional measures, but they criticised them respectively 34, 33 and 23 times, whereas 
regulators and private entities who proposed most of the institutional measures hardly voiced any 
criticism. It seems that a critical attitude toward the policy process is justified by a lack of use of 
urgency discourse. This explains why civil society and national politicians, for example, were at liberty 
to criticise the facilitation of urgency. Local politicians seemed more balanced as they voiced 
significant criticism of the exclusion of actors and lack of problem analysis as well. Most of their 
criticism, however, was aimed at the suppression of alternatives, which may be explained by the fact 
that the planning committee sought to construct the gas terminal in their constituencies.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] Figure 1 Urgency Statements by Regulators 
Since regulators constitute a broad actor group that includes various ministries with different 
responsibilities, further focus upon this actor group may reveal nuances within government regarding 
the uses of urgency discourse. Figure 1 examines in greater detail the breakdown of urgency statements 
into referent objects by the regulator. Regulators account for 82 of 108 urgency statements. Only those 
regulators that made 3 or more urgency statements are included in this figure. 
Figure 1 clearly shows that the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of Interior are responsible 
for most cases of urgency, whereas the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection hardly make use of this framing strategy. It is striking that both the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Ministry of Interior rationalise raising urgency by referring to an array of referent objects 
whereas the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the Ministry of Finance not only raise 
significantly less urgency, but also refer to fewer referent objects. Unsurprisingly, the concerns of the 
ministries seem to coincide with their ministerial responsibilities. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection refers more to environmental concerns whereas the Ministry of Finance refers relatively 
often to affordability. 
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The timing of urgency 
Urgency was not raised randomly, but surfaced at various deliberate and sensitive moments during the 
planning process. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] Figure 2 Triggers for Urgency 
Figure 2 presents the contextual events that trigger the use of urgency discourse. Out of a total of 108 
urgency statements, 47 were triggered by an external event, 54 by an internal event and only 7 urgency 
statements were not attached to a trigger. External events are divided into two major categories. 
Resource scarcity triggered 35 urgency statements, parliamentary debates provided the context for 8 
urgency statement and 4 urgency statements were triggered in the context of both parliamentary 
debates and resource scarcity. Internal events break down into the categories of agenda-setting and 
deciding on alternatives, triggering 23 and 31 urgency statements respectively.  
Resource scarcity is referred to the most, accounting for 35% of contextual events in total. Resource 
scarcity includes the anticipated scarcity of natural gas as a result of the depletion of existing 
operational gas fields, and the acute natural gas scarcity following the stop in the supply of Egyptian 
gas. The second major trigger for urgency is the internal contextual event of decision-making on 
alternative sites for gas terminals. Deciding on alternatives includes the hotly contested decisions on 
the location of the gas terminal which generated a lively debate in all venues on the benefits of an 
offshore gas platform as opposed to onshore gas treatment facilities. The third major trigger for urgency 
is agenda-setting. When in 2009 it was decided that the first draft of the policy plan should be finished 
within one year, several urgency statements were triggered. Eventually urgency was used in this 
particular case as an argument to coax the Ministry of Environmental Protection into accepting a non-
binding report on the environmental impact of the policy plan instead of a binding document by means 
of an environmental impact assessment.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] Figure 3 Timeline of Events 
Figure 3 presents urgency statements as a function of the timing of the contextual events that triggered 
them. The oscillation of urgency intensity as reflected by the peaks and lows of urgency statement 
frequency suggest that contextual events vary from time to time in the degree to which they trigger 
urgency. The transitory connection of contextual events to urgency is evident. Urgency peaks coincide 
with major external events and important internal decisions in the planning process. For example, the 
internal contextual events of deciding on alternatives triggered much urgency discourse as illustrated 
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by the peaks of mid-2009, the first quarter of 2010 and the first half of 2012. Another example is the 
acute resource scarcity following the definite stop of supply of Egyptian gas, which resulted in an 
upsurge in urgency at the end of 2011 in the wake of a long period of repeated attacks on the gas 




Many studies have suggested that poor planning of mega-projects has detrimental results in terms of 
cost overruns and benefit shortfalls (e.g., Altshuler and Luberoff 2003; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). The root 
cause of this recurrent bias in the evaluation of mega-project planning is neither technical nor 
economical, but instead derives from conflicting political ideas, institutional biases and ideologies 
(McFarlane and Rutherford 2008). As a result of these biases, mega-projects are often highly contested 
around the mobilisation of support by framing the policy issue as a crisis (Jhagroe and Frantzeskaki 
2015).  
Framing has an emotional dimension which greatly influences the way in which information is 
processed and dealt with (Gross 2014). Events become associated with emotions that affect the way in 
which one interprets and responds to those events. As a result, emotions directly help shape reality 
(Nabi 2003). The emotional dimension of framing thus plays an influential role in guiding policy 
preferences and decision-making (see Lu and Schuldt 2015; Roeser 2012; Smith and Leiserowitz 
2014). Ultimately, framing is about legitimising a course of action that coincides with the perception of 
reality of the decision-maker (Rein and Schön 1993).  
One way to trigger emotional reactions in decision-making is by framing resource scarcities (see e.g., 
Giglioni and Swyngedouw 2008; Ioris 2012; Mehta 2001), and development agendas (see e.g., Garb 
2004; Follmann 2015; Majoor 2011), as crises demanding urgent policy action. Crises can be used by 
government to recklessly enact significant policy measures without adhering to proper practices of 
problem analysis and oversight (Higgs 2010). However, when, how, and by whom urgency is 
constructed in the policy process, and how urgency facilitates mobilising support for a policy, remain 
unattested. This study contributes to our understanding of how urgency shapes the policy process, and 
through hastily decisions becomes institutionalised in the implementation of the adopted policy. The 
institutionalisation of planning practices has been suggested time and again in various studies (e.g., 
Fischhendler and Nathan 2014; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), yet this study demonstrates the 
motives by which these practices are discursively constructed in the policy process.  
The results of this study indicate that the policy discussions concerning the infrastructure mega-project 
for the exploitation of Israeli gas reserves were highly saturated with urgency discourse, which 
contributed to a sense of crisis in the policy process and justified the facilitation of urgency by means 
of institutional measures. A sense of crisis was found to be conveyed mainly through rhetoric that 
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ascribes a shortened perception of time to the policy process and a few metaphorical phrases that depict 
the policy process as urgent. The policy process was presented as urgent by framing the policy in 
conjunction with referent objects that are seen as threatened by a lack of urgent action. Actors 
discursively mobilised emotions by anchoring urgency in different ideologies, concerns and 
legitimising factors. This study found that the manner in which urgency discourse was portrayed was a 
function of the actor and the type of venue where urgency was raised. For example, in the designated 
planning venues, urgency discourse was legitimised more by environmental concerns whereas in 
parliament, urgency was anchored considerably in concerns for Israel's economic development and 
dependency on foreign energy imports. This suggests that emotions and biases are mobilised 
strategically by portraying urgency in ways that appeal to the target audience.  
Urgency was facilitated by proposing institutional measures aimed at streamlining the policy process 
and suppressing the time consuming exploration of alternative policy solutions (see table 3). The 
discursive construction of urgency in the policy process mostly took place in the venues where 
regulators were strongly represented. This seems to agree with hypothesis 5 that urgency discourse is 
more likely to be found in the venues where actors who are keen on the speedy finalisation of the 
planning process are strongly represented. The national and designated planning venues proved to be 
most receptive to this discursive framing strategy, whereas political venues were more critical of 
urgency and urgency-driven institutional measures (see table 2). Urgency thus seems to be a discursive 
strategy to temporarily present the policy issue as a crisis demanding a unified response. However, the 
role of urgency in facilitating a unified response during decisive stages of the policy cycle is limited. 
Figure 3 reveals that sharp increases in urgency use are accompanied by large increases in critical 
responses to urgency. Table 3 shows that the use of urgency discourse and criticism thereof are usually 
not voiced by the same actors, which was already suggested in hypothesis 2. Actors who raise more 
urgency tend to voice less criticism and vice versa. Once the policy issue is framed as urgent, the 
legislature and judiciary may curb that ambition, which is reflected in the high count of critical 
responses to urgency by various national and local politicians, as well as in the success of legal action 
against improper planning practices. For example, legal action by local politicians resulted in the court-
ordered restart of the planning process of NOP 37/H in 2010 (see High Court of Justice 2010).  
The results of this study confirm hypothesis 3 that posits that most uses of urgency discourse are 
triggered by contextual events. Given Israel's position as an energy island, resource scarcity 
unsurprisingly triggered the majority of references to the perceived urgent nature of developing 
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indigenous gas reserves (see figure 2). This observation supports other studies that recognise resource 
scarcity as a primary context for crisis-driven decision-making (e.g., Fischhendler and Nathan 2014; 
Giglioni and Swyngedouw 2008; Ioris 2012; Mehta 2001). The study also found that urgency is not 
used randomly throughout the policy cycle. The results reveal that urgency was a pervasive motive 
during the early stage of agenda-setting and the later stage of decision-making in the policy cycle (see 
figures 2 and 3). This may indicate that urgency discourse is employed strategically at decisive 
moments during the policy process to inhibit the choice of other solutions by delegitimising criticism in 
name of the urgency of the matter, which supports hypothesis 4. 
The reason for urgency framing is therefore to manipulate the policy process by presenting a limited 
and exclusive view of the policy, which weakens the position of those actors who oppose the proposed 
policy solution (De Jong 2008). This supports the notion that in the policy cycle, almost every problem 
that is presented as demanding policy action by the government, is characterised by “a surprising 
degree of agreement on its gravity and on the limited number of options open for resolving it” (Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003: 16). Urgency may thus be a strategic discursive tool that is used to effectuate an 
artificial crisis in which multiple and opposing policy views are less tolerated. As a result, the interests 
of powerful actors are advanced whilst those of lesser actors are marginalised. Likewise, this study 
found that powerful regulators and private entities pushed for timely policy change and employed 
urgency discourse disproportionately more than the actors defending the status quo (see table 3). The 
use of urgency discourse thus primarily favours the interests of the powerful and seems to function as a 






The aim of this study was to assess the role of urgency in mega-project planning. Mega-projects are 
known to be highly controversial and rarely provide a solution to the problems they are intended to 
solve. Planning scholars have repeatedly stressed that successful mega-project planning demands 
adequate problem analysis and deliberate postponement of a commitment to a policy alternative in 
order to guarantee planning flexibility up to the stage of project implementation (see Flyvbjerg et al. 
2003; Hertogh et al. 2008; Priemus 2008, 2010). Yet time and again, mega-projects fail to deliver their 
anticipated outcome. A possible explanation may be associated with the prevalence of urgency 
discourse during the planning process. This framing mode contradicts proper planning practices, 
empowering certain actors to advance their interests whilst denying others the possibility to partake in 
the planning process or promote their preferred planning alternatives. No study, however, has explained 
why, how, and when actors construct urgency in the planning process. Therefore, this study critically 
scrutinises the practice of urgency framing whilst discerning how a variety of actors strategically 
employ urgency discourse, mobilising cognitive, emotional and institutional biases to advance partisan 
interests. At the basis of this study is the assumption that a perception of reality is constructed through 
the language that is used to describe it. Thus the intent of the study was not to determine whether or not 
urgency is genuine. It is only concerned with the mobilisation of urgency toward a policy goal. 
Accordingly, this study examines when and in what manner the planning process for development of 
the newly discovered gas reserves became urgent due to its discursive portrayal by various entrenched 
interest groups. 
The analysis of the protocols shows that urgency was raised deliberately at various decisive moments 
during the policy process. Urgency was legitimised by referring to a range of different referent objects, 
indicating that urgency was employed strategically as a discursive tool to portray the policy in a crisis 
frame that resonates with the target audience. This framing process was primarily conveyed through 
rhetoric that associates haste and panic with the policy process. In the context of perceived resource 
scarcity, this found fertile ground in the national planning venues where regulators responsible for the 
realisation of the project were strongly represented. Once the policy process was framed as a crisis, a 
sense of urgency drove decision-makers to adopt institutional measures that aimed at facilitating 
urgency, but were discordant with proper planning practices. This may indicate that urgency 
compromises effective policy-making by advancing elite priorities through excessive institutional 
measures whilst marginalising the voice of critical actors. However, further investigation is needed, 
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especially research that correlates the use of urgency discourse with actual policy action and legislation, 
which may motivate the ability of urgency to drive policy change.  
In the context of Israel's position as an energy island in a hostile environment, one may question the 
applicability of the results of this study to other cases that may be characterised by a less volatile 
regional context and the availability of natural resources. Yet even in Israel, urgency was not raised 
randomly, nor was it a motive that was present during the whole planning process. Peaks in the use of 
urgency discourse coincided with prominent events that had profound influence on the policy process. 
Moreover, critical responses to urgency were widely found in various planning and political venues. 
For example, in such countries as Brazil (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013), Spain (Majoor 2011) and the 
Netherlands (Huijs 2011; Jhagroe and Frantzeskaki 2015), urgency is known to have played a decisive 
role in the planning of infrastructure and urban mega-projects. Urgency is thus not an exclusively 
Israeli phenomenon rooted in Israel's unique characteristics, but instead seems of a more general 
nature. However, comparative research into the role of urgency in different planning processes may be 
needed to deepen our understanding of urgency in general. 
The findings of this study stress the need to examine the role of urgency in policy areas other than 
infrastructure mega-projects. Mega-projects are known to be extraordinary projects in terms of 
conflicting interests and detrimental impacts of poor planning because of their sheer size and scope 
(Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). It may be that the effect of urgency is similarly inflated in relation to mega-
project planning. Nonetheless, the study highlights that urgency is not an objective quality of decision-
making, but rather an evolving social concept discursively constructed by actors who seek to justify the 
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Table 1 Overview of Dataset 
Venue Timespan # of Protocols # of Urgency Statements # of Critical Responses to Urgency Ratio of Critical Responses to Urgency to Urgency Statements 
National 2009-2014 35 60 34 0.6 
Designated 2009-2013 8 16 3 0.2 
Regional 2009-2014 44 4 7 1.8 
Parliament 2009-2014 30 28 30 1.1 





















Table 2 Urgency and Criticism by Venue 




n % Institutional Measures 
Proposed 
n % Criticism of Institutional 
Measure 
n % Ratio of Institutional Measure 
Proposed to Criticism of 
Institutional Measure 
National 60 Unclear 23 32 Suppression of 
Alternatives 
23 37 Suppression of Alternatives 14 31 1.6 
  Economic Development 4 6 Streamline of Procedure 39 62 Streamline of Procedure 24 53 1.6 
  Foreign Dependency 5 7 Exclusion of Actor 1 2 Exclusion of Actor 3 7 0.5 
  Affordability 9 13    Lack of Problem Analysis 4 9 0.2 
  Energy Availability 24 34        
  Environmental Concern 6 8        
            
Designated 16 Unclear 5 26 Suppression of 
Alternatives 
5 33 Suppression of Alternatives 2 33 2.0 
  Economic Development 1 5 Streamline of Procedure 10 67 Streamline of Procedure 3 50 2.8 
  Foreign Dependency 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0 0 1.0 
  Affordability 2 11    Lack of Problem Analysis 1 17 0.5 
  Energy Availability 6 32        
  Environmental Concern 5 26        
            
Regional 3 Unclear 1 20 Suppression of 
Alternatives 
2 67 Suppression of Alternatives 2 33 1.0 
  Economic Development 0 0 Streamline of Procedure 1 33 Streamline of Procedure 3 50 0.5 
  Foreign Dependency 1 20 Exclusion of Actor 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 1 17 0.5 
  Affordability 0 0    Lack of Problem Analysis 0 0 1.0 
  Energy Availability 2 40        
  Environmental Concern 1 20        
            
Parliament 28 Unclear 1 3 Suppression of 
Alternatives 
5 38 Suppression of Alternatives 16 37 0.4 
  Economic Development 6 16 Streamline of Procedure 8 62 Streamline of Procedure 21 49 0.4 
  Foreign Dependency 6 16 Exclusion of Actor 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 2 5 0.3 
  Affordability 4 11    Lack of Problem Analysis 4 9 0.2 
  Energy Availability 16 42        





Table 3 Urgency and Criticism by Actor 




n % Institutional Measures 
Proposed 
n % Criticism of Institutional 
Measure 
n % Ratio of Institutional Measure 
Proposed to Criticism of 
Institutional Measure 
Regulators 82 Unclear 27 27 Suppression of Alternatives 25 32 Suppression of Alternatives 1 11 13.0 
  Economic Development 6 6 Streamline of Procedure 51 66 Streamline of Procedure 7 78 6.5 
  Foreign Dependency 12 12 Exclusion of Actor 1 1 Exclusion of Actor 0 0 2.0 
  Affordability 14 14    Lack of Problem Analysis 1 11 0.5 
  Energy Availability 35 35        
  Environmental Concern 7         
            
Private Entities 14 Unclear 1 7 Suppression of Alternatives 6  Suppression of Alternatives 0 0 7.0 
  Economic Development 3 21 Streamline of Procedure 3  Streamline of Procedure 0 0 4.0 
  Foreign Dependency 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0  Exclusion of Actor 0 0 1.0 
  Affordability 0 0    Lack of Problem Analysis 1 100 0.5 
  Energy Availability 8 57        
  Environmental Concern 2 14        
            
Civil Society 6 Unclear 0 0 Suppression of Alternatives 2  Suppression of Alternatives 7 30 0.4 
  Economic Development 1 10 Streamline of Procedure 1  Streamline of Procedure 15 65 0.1 
  Foreign Dependency 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0  Exclusion of Actor 1 4 0.5 
  Affordability 0 0    Lack of Problem Analysis 0 0 1.0 
  Energy Availability 3 30        
  Environmental Concern 6 60        
            
Local Politicians 3 Unclear 1 20 Suppression of Alternatives 2  Suppression of Alternatives 13 39 0.2 
  Economic Development 0 0 Streamline of Procedure 1  Streamline of Procedure 11 33 0.2 
  Foreign Dependency 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0  Exclusion of Actor 4 12 0.2 
  Affordability 1 20    Lack of Problem Analysis 5 15 0.2 
  Energy Availability 1 20        
  Environmental Concern 2 40        
            
National Politicians 3 Unclear 1 33 Suppression of Alternatives 0  Suppression of Alternatives 13 38 0.1 
  Economic Development 1 33 Streamline of Procedure 2  Streamline of Procedure 18 53 0.2 
  Foreign Dependency 0 0 Exclusion of Actor 0  Exclusion of Actor 1 3 0.5 
  Affordability 0 0    Lack of Problem Analysis 2 6 0.3 
  Energy Availability 1 33        
  Environmental Concern 0 0        
 
